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Abstract
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties.
In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties.
In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a dispropor-
tionate inuence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties inuence
decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do
not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have
not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful par-
ties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys
incentives to collect information.
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"Practical politicians and journalists have long understood that small special
interestgroups, the vested interests, have disproportionate power...[a group] will
sometimes attain its objective even if the vast majority of the population loses as a
result."
 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p.127-128.
"There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political ques-
tions in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who wields the
coercive power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all occasions.
 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p.107.
"So that the population of these civilised countries now falls into two main
classes: those who own wealth invested in large holdings and who thereby control
the conditions of life for the rest; and those who do not own wealth in su¢ ciently
large holdings, and whose conditions are therefore controlled by these others...It is
a division between the vested interests and the common man."
 Thorstein Veblen, The Vested Interests and The Common Man, p.160-161.
"All privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used their power in the interest
of their own selshness..."
 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book IV p.133.
1 Introduction
In a wide variety of situations, people make decisions on the basis of information
supplied by other people. Often those who provide information have a "stake" in the
nal decision. A prominent example of such a situation is a civil lawsuit involving
a dispute between two parties about a distributional issue. Each party supplies
information in an attempt to inuence the judges decision in its own favor. Another
well-known example is a politician who makes a decision that a¤ects various interest
groups. Again each group may provide information with an eye on inuencing the
politicians nal decision to its own benet. When decisions are made on the basis of
information provided by interested parties, there are usually two (related) concerns.
First, interested parties have incentives to reveal information that is favorable for
them, but to conceal information that is unfavorable for them. As a result, the
decision maker possibly does not hear all available information. Second, the means
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of interest groups vary widely. An implication is that decisions may be biased
towards the interests of the more powerful interest groups.
The main objective of this paper is to shed light on these two concerns. To
this end, we develop a game-theoretical model in which a neutral person has to
resolve a distributional dispute between two parties; say, an amount of money is
to be distributed. The socially optimal decision depends on the state of the world.
The parties, however, have opposite interests that do not depend on the state of
the world. As to learning the state, the decision maker has to rely on information
provided by the parties. We assume that the parties do not observe the state of
the world1, but each party can exert e¤ort to nd veriable information about it.
The more e¤ort a party puts in collecting information, the higher is the probability
that a party receives veriable information about the state. If information is found,
a party has to determine whether to reveal or conceal it. An important feature of
our model is that parties may di¤er in the (marginal) cost they attach to exerting
e¤ort. The implication is that there is a relatively advantaged party and a relatively
disadvantaged party. In this way, we are able to address the concern regarding the
inuence of powerful interest groups on decisions. Another important feature of our
model is that given the available information, the decision maker aims at making
the socially optimal decision.
We derive four main results. The rst one is neither novel nor surprising. Par-
ties reveal information that promotes their interests, but conceal information that
damages their interests.
Our second result is more subtle. The party that is relatively advantaged in
terms of collecting information has stronger incentives to reveal it. The reason
for this result is that when the advantaged party does not reveal information, the
decision maker is inclined to believe that the party has something to hide. As
a result, when neither party presents evidence, the decision is biased towards the
interest of the disadvantaged party.
Third, in expected terms, the nal decision does not depend on the relative
strength of the parties. This neutrality result sheds light on the role of powerful in-
terest groups in politics. Our model predicts that indeed relatively powerful interest
1In section 8 we show that our main results also hold when parties observe the state of the
world but must exert e¤ort to communicate information.
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groups frequently provide information that shapes policy. However, our model also
predicts that if powerful interest groups do not provide information, decisions are
made against their interests. In expected terms, these e¤ects cancel out because of
the Martingale property.
Our nal result is that a policy that compels parties to reveal information de-
stroys their incentives to collect information.
Together our results indicate that the concern that interested parties have in-
centives to conceal information is justied. However, compelling parties to supply
information does not help. It would only weaken incentives to collect information.
The concern for biased decisions because some parties have easier access to informa-
tion than others is less justied. Rational decision makers take the relative strength
of parties into account in such a way that di¤erences in the power of parties do not
lead to biases in decisions.
It is important to point out from the outset that we obtain our results from a
model of informational lobbying, in which the decision maker is unbiased. Of course,
once the decision maker is biased or can be bribed our result that in expected terms
the relative power of parties is irrelevant does not hold any more.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to two broad strands of economic literature. First is the liter-
ature on law and economics; researchers have investigated attorneysincentives to
collect and convey information in adversarial systems. An early paper is by Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) who show that communication between interested parties with
opposed interests leads to full-information decisions. Crucial assumptions for this
result are (1) that information can be credibly transmitted, and (2) that parties are
fully informed. When parties are not always fully informed, full revelation disap-
pears (Austen-Smith, 1994, Shin, 1994, and Swank, 2011). Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999) show that parties with opposing preference have also strong incentives to col-
lect information (see also Dur and Swank, 2005, and Kim, 2010). In the literature
on adversarial systems, our paper is closest to Sobel (1985), who examines parties
incentives to report information in case of a dispute over an indivisible asset. As in
our paper, in Sobel one party might be more advantageous in reporting information
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than the other party. Sobel examines how di¤erent rules of proof of evidence a¤ect
partiesincentives. Our paper deviates from Sobel in that we focus on a dispute over
a divisible asset. Moreover, we explicitly distinguish between incentives to collect
information and incentives to transfer information.
Second, our paper is related to the voluminous literature on interest groups (for
surveys, see Mitchell and Munger, 1991, Mueller, 2003, and Austen-Smith, 1997).
Olson (1965) argues that smaller groups face lower costs to organize themselves, and
consequently may have a disproportionate inuence on policy. In Tullock (1980) and
Becker (1985) interest groups decide how many resources to spend on lobbying. The
amount of resources a¤ects the probability of inuencing the decision. It is this
type of literature that predicts that an interest group with more resources has a
bigger say in policy decisions. The early literature on lobbying posits the existence
of an inuence function describing how lobbying e¤orts a¤ect policy. Potters and
Van Winden (1992) provide a micro-foundation for these inuence functions. A key
assumption of their model is that an interest group possesses information that is
relevant for a legislator. By paying a cost an interest group can credibly transmit
information to the legislator. Potters and Van Winden show that the more the
preferences of the interest group and the legislator are aligned, the wider is the
scope for information transmission2. The paper on lobbying that is most closely
related to ours is by Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) who, like us, model two
groups that try to inuence the decision of a legislator. Each group decides whether
or not to become informed. This decision is observed by the legislator. Next, the
two groups send messages to the legislator who makes the nal decision. Our model
deviates from Austen-Smith and Wright in three main respects. First, in our model,
the decision and states are continuous rather than binary. Second, in our model,
the decision-maker does not observe whether or not parties are informed. Finally,
one of the main questions we address is whether more powerful interest groups have
a bigger say in decisions, whereas the model by Austen-Smith and Wright is very
suitable for understanding groups decisions on whether to lobby or not. Grossman
and Helpman (2001) develop a cheap-talk model where interest groups are fully
informed, but information is not veriable3. Their model too is more suitable to
2See also Grossman and Helpman (2001).
3See also Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Swank and Visser (2011).
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understand group decisions on whether to lobby or not. Moreover, their focus lies
on the requirements for credibility when talk is cheap. They show that credibility
improves with the amount of resources a group spends and thus provide a rationale
for why interest groups spend more than is necessary to communicate messages.
3 The Model
Our model describes a situation where a decision has to be made with important
distributional consequences. One can think, for example, of the allocation of a tax.
We assume that it is common knowledge that there is a socially optimal decision in
the sense that reasons may exist why one party should be favored to the determint of
another party. To learn these reasons, the decision maker relies on the information
supplied by the interested parties. We consider a setting in which each party wants
to make a case for itself.
A decision maker has to make a decision on x. One can think of the decision
maker as a politician, a CEO, or a judge. The problem is that the proper decision
is uncertain. This uncertainty is reected by the stochastic term , the state of
the world, which is uniformly distributed on the interval [l; h]. The decision maker
chooses x so as to minimize the expected deviation of x from , given the information
I it possesses: minx : E (jx  j jI).
To learn , the decision maker has to rely on information provided by two inter-
ested parties, i 2 fa; bg. One can think of a party as an interest group, a manager of
a division, or an attorney. Neither party knows  initially. However, each party may
collect information to learn  and receive a signal si 2 f; g : Collecting information
is costly. Specically, we assume that each party i chooses e¤ort i 2 [0; 1), where
i denotes the probability with which party i nds veriable information about ,
si = . With probability 1   i party i does not nd information, si = ?. For
simplicity, we assume that the cost of information collection is quadratic: 1
2
i
2
i ,
with i > 12 (h  l).4 An important feature of our model is that a may di¤er from
4In the appendix we show that if i  12 (h  l), an equilibrium exists in which party i chooses
i = 1 and always reveals information to the decision maker. As a result, party  i is redundant.
By assuming i > 12 (h  l), we ensure that the model focuses on environments where both parties
have incentives to collect information. This is the most relevant environment to investigate how
the relative strength of parties a¤ects decisions.
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b. If a < b, we say that party a is the more powerful party. The parameter i
may capture a few things. First, i may depend on the resources party i possesses to
collect information. Second, the e¢ ciency with which a party collects information
may a¤ect i. Third, i may depend on party is position in the economy. For
instance, information about the impact of a deregulation in an industry often lies
in the hands of that industry. In this paper, we take a broad view of the various
factors that may determine i.
We assume that the two parties have opposing preferences. Party a wants the
decision maker to choose a high value of x, whereas party b wants the decision maker
to choose a low value of x. The payo¤s to party a and b are given by:
Ua (x) = x  1
2
a
2
a (1)
and
Ub (x) =  x  1
2
b
2
b (2)
respectively:
After the parties have collected information, the communication stage starts. In
this stage, the two parties simultaneously send a message, mi, to the decision maker.
A party conditions its message on the information it received, mi (si). We assume
that information cannot be forged but can be concealed. Thus, if party i did not
nd information in the collection stage, it cannot supply information, mi (?) = ?.
If, by contrast, party i found information, say si = 0; it either sends mi (0) = 0
(reveals) or mi (0) = ? (conceals). After the parties have sent their messages, the
decision maker chooses x.
We assume that the structure of the game and the distribution of  is common
knowledge. Our model is a dynamic game with imperfect information. We solve it
by backward induction and identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). The deci-
sion maker chooses x so as to minimize E (jx  j jma;mb). Parties anticipate the
decision makers decision rule.
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4 The Communication Stage
Each party enters the communication stage either with the possibility to present
evidence to the decision maker or without this possibility. This depends on whether
or not a party was successful in the information collection stage. We call a party that
is able to reveal information "informed", and a party that is not able "uninformed".
By assumption, an uninformed party sends mi (?) = ?. The question remains for
which values of  an informed party sends mi () = ? and for which values of  it
sends mi () = . Proposition 1 presents the equilibrium communication strategy
of an informed party.
Proposition 1 In a PBE, parties communication strategies can be characterized
by a single threshold, T . An informed party a chooses ma () =  if and only if
  T = E (jma = mb = ?). An informed party b chooses mb () =  if and only
if   T .
Proposition 1 is an implication of our assumption that the parties have opposing
preferences. Information that is favorable for party a is unfavorable for party b, and
vice versa. At  = T , both parties are indi¤erent between revealing information
(mi () = ) and concealing it (mi () = ?). The decision of a party whether
or not to reveal information is only relevant in case the other party does not reveal
information. As the decision maker chooses x =  if either party reveals information,
mi (si) is not relevant if m i () = . So, to determine party as decision whether
or not to report information, suppose mb (sb) = ? and sa = 0 2 fl; hg. Clearly,
ma (
0) = ? induces the decision maker to choose x = E (jma = mb = ?), while
ma (
0) = 0 induces the decision maker to choose x = 0. Hence, party a is
indi¤erent between ma (0) = 0 and ma (0) = ? if
0 = T = E (jma = mb = ?) (3)
For party b, the same equation can be derived.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that in case both parties are able to
provide evidence, the decision maker makes the full-information decision. This re-
sult is similar to the result derived by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) that competition
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between informed parties whose preferences are opposed leads to full-information de-
cisions. Proposition 1 also implies that parties never provide evidence that conicts
with their own interests.
5 Information Collection
We now turn to a partys decision on how much e¤ort to put in collecting veri-
able information. Consider party a. When choosing a party a anticipates that it
will only reveal information in the communication stage if   T . Moreover, it
anticipates that if party b nds information, it will reveal it if and only if   T .
Finally, it knows that revealing  leads to x = . The expected payo¤ to party a
when choosing a equals
Pr
 
  T  a1
2
 
h+ T

+ (1  a)T

+ (4)
Pr
 
  T  b1
2
 
T + l

+ (1  b)T

  1
2
a
2
a
The rst (second) term of (4) pertains to the range of  for which party a (b) reveals
information if it is found. The third term gives the cost of e¤ort.
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to a; and using Pr
 
  T  = h T
h l and Pr
 
  T  =
T l
h l , we attain
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a =
 
h  T 2
2a (h  l) (5)
Equation (5) shows that the higher is the deviation of T from h, the more e¤ort
party a puts in collecting information. Of course, the reason for this result is that the
deviation of T from h is directly related to the probability that party a will utilize
its information. To put it somewhat di¤erently, party a has stronger incentives to
collect information when it anticipates that the information is likely to be favorable
to its cause. Obviously, it also has stronger incentives when the cost of collecting
information is small.
5Because of our assumption i > 12 (h  l), a < 1.
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In a similar way, one can derive the amount of e¤ort party b exerts:
b =
 
T   l2
2b (h  l) (6)
Note that party bs e¤ort strategy is the converse of party as strategy. When party
b anticipates that it is likely to nd information that is favorable to its cause, it has
strong incentives to collect information.
6 The threshold T
In Section 4, we have identied the communication strategies of the two parties. In
these strategies, the threshold T plays an important role. Party a reveals infor-
mation if and only if it has found that   T , while the opposite holds for party
b. In the previous section, we have examined the incentives of parties to collect
information. Again the threshold T turned out to be important. In the present
section, we use partiesstrategies to determine the threshold T .
In Section 4, we have shown that the threshold T equals the expected value of
x, conditional on ma = ? and mb = ?. The decision maker knows that if both
parties had found information, one of them would have revealed it. He can therefore
infer from ma = ? and mb = ? that at most one party found information. As a
consequence, parties not revealing information can be a result of three events. First,
party a found information, but decided not to reveal it. Then,  < T . Second,
party b found information, but decided not to reveal it, so that  > T . Third,
neither party found information. As a and b are independent of , in the third
event the expected value of  equals 1
2
(l + h). Together these events imply the
following expression for T
T =
a (1  b)

T l
h l

l+T
2
+ b (1  a)

h T
h l

T+h
2
+ (1  a) (1  b) l+h2
a (1  b)

T l
h l

+ b (1  a)

h T
h l

+ (1  a) (1  b)
(7)
which can be rewritten as,
 
T
2
(a   b) + 2T [h (1  a)  l (1  b)]  h2 (1  a) + l2 (1  b) = 0 (8)
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To better understand how T depends on a and b, rst suppose that a = b.
Then, (8) reduces to T = 1
2
(l + h). This implies that in the absence of information,
the decision maker chooses a neutral decision when parties exert the same amount
of e¤ort. Now suppose a 6= b. Straightforward, but tedious, algebra shows that
T is increasing in b and decreasing in a. A direct implication is that for a > b,
in the absence of information, a decision is made that is biased against party a. The
intuition is straightforward. If a > b, the decision maker attributes a relatively
high probability to the event that party a possesses information. Consequently, in
case neither party provides information in the communication stage, the decision
maker is especially suspicious that party a wants to hide information. Likewise for
b > a and ma = ? and mb = ?, a decision is made that is biased against party b.
The e¤ect of a 6= b on the decision on x inuences partiesincentives to collect
information. Recall that party as e¤ort equals a =
(h T )2
2a(h l) . Clearly, the lower is
T , the higher is a. Again, this e¤ect has a clear intuition. Party a anticipates
that in case the decision maker does not receive information about , he will make a
decision that is biased against its interest. This gives a stronger incentive for party
a to collect information.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, T is implicitly determined by (8). If i <  i and
ma = mb = ?, a decision is made that is biased against party i. This further
strengthens party is incentives to put e¤ort in collecting information.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 depicts the relation between T and both cost parameters, a and b.
Here we assume  2 [ 1; 1]. Figure 1 (left) shows that for a given a (b), the
threshold decreases (increases) with b (a). The gray wired surface depicts the
plane where T = 0. Figure 1 (right) is the same plot viewed from above. The
region above the diagonal (wired) represents T < l+h
2
= 0 and the region below the
diagonal represents T > 0. It is evident that if a < b, then T < 0; the decision
is biased against party a.
Proposition 2 sheds a new light on the claim that powerful interest groups are
able to put a stamp on policy. Our model predicts that indeed powerful interest
groups frequently provide evidence that heavily inuences policy. In this sense,
it is true that powerful interest groups have a disproportionate inuence on policy.
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Figure 1: Threshold T as a function of cost parameters, a and b.
However, we have also shown that in case a powerful interest group does not provide
information, the decision is biased against its interest.
The next proposition shows that the relative strength of interest groups does not
a¤ect the expected decision on x.
Proposition 3 In expected terms, the value of i relative to  i does not a¤ect the
decision on x.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the Martingale property and we interpret
it as a neutrality result. Of course, when one of the assumptions of our model is
relaxed the neutrality result may break down. For example, we have asssumed that
the decision maker knows the relative strength of parties. If the decision maker
were to have a wrong perception of i, the neutrality result would no longer hold.
Underestimation of the relative strength of a party induces the decision maker, in
expected terms, to choose a policy that is favorable for that party. It is also im-
portant to emphasize that the neutrality result only holds for informative lobbying.
Evidently, allowing for bribes may alter our results.
7 Forcing parties to reveal their information
In the previous sections we have analyzed incentives of parties to collect and supply
information. We have shown that a party only reveals information that benets its
cause. In the current section we examine the implications of a policy that forces
each party to reveal its information, whether that information is favorable for it
or not. Such a policy in our model is akin to the assumption that information
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cannot be concealed. Consequently, the communication strategy of party i be-
comes: mi (si) =  for si 2 [l; h], and mi (?) = ?. Note that in this setting the
expected value of  when the decision maker does not receive information equals
E (jma = ?;mb = ?) = 12 (l + h).
The resulting model revolves around information collection. When choosing the
amount of e¤ort to exert, parties anticipate that any information they nd will be
revealed, leading to x = . Thus, the expected payo¤ to party a when choosing a
is
(1  a) (1  b)

h+ l
2

+ [1  (1  a) (1  b)]

h+ l
2

  1
2
a
2
a
The rst term is the expected payo¤ in case neither party nds information. The
second term is the expected payo¤ in case either of the two (or both) parties nd
information. The last term is the cost of e¤ort. The rst-order condition with
respect to a implies that the amount of e¤ort party a exerts is a = 0. Similarly,
one can show that party b has no incentive to collect information. Hence, compelling
parties to reveal their information completely eliminates their incentives to become
informed. This brings us to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 A policy that compels parties to reveal their information eliminates
their incentives to collect information.
Proposition 4 casts doubts on the e¢ ciency of rules in legal systems that compel
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.
8 Costly Communication
So far, we have focused on a situation where parties have to exert e¤ort to nd
information. An alternative situation is that parties have information but have to
make e¤ort to convey it to the decision maker.6 To analyze the latter case, we
assume that when choosing their strategies on e¤ort, parties know . In the new
6Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to
policy makers. For a review of empirical models of interest group inuence see Potters and Sloof
(1996) and Stratmann (2005).
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model, i denotes the probability that party i is able to provide veriable evidence
to the decision maker, and i can be interpreted as a measure of party is accessbility
to the decision maker. Specically, in the alternative game we have that (1) nature
chooses  and reveals it to the parties, but not to the decision maker; (2) each party
chooses e¤ort on the basis of , i (); (3) if party i is able to reveal information, it
reveals it or conceals it; (4) the decision maker chooses x.
The assumption about the observability of  does not have consequences for the
strategies followed in the communication stage. The communication strategies can
again be characterized by a single threshold, T . Each party only reveals information
when it perceives that it will lead to a more favorable decision.
Incentives to exert e¤ort, however, are di¤erent in the present model. Because
each party observes the state, e¤ort is conditional on the state. The more favorable
is the state to party i, the stronger are its incentives to exert e¤ort.7 Moreover, if
  T , party a does not exert e¤ort, and if   T party b does not exert e¤ort.
Thus, either party a or party b tries to convey information.
The assumption about the observability of  does not a¤ect our main result that
in expected terms, the relative power of parties does not inuence the decision on
x. Of course, the reason is that also in the present model the Martingale property
implies that the expected value of x equals 1
2
(l + h).
9 Conclusion
Do more powerful interest groups have a disproportionate inuence on policy? We
have shown in this paper that in an environment where interest groups try to inu-
ence decisions by concealing or revealing information, the answer to this question
is in the negative. By often providing information, more powerful interest groups
do frequently inuence policies. However, when they abstain from providing infor-
mation, decisions are biased against their interests. In expected terms, these e¤ects
cancel out.
We regard our neutrality result as a benchmark. Interest groups may systemat-
ically a¤ect policies in case the assumptions underlying our model are violated. For
7Specically, a () =
 T
a
for  > T and a () = 0 for   T , and b () = 
T 
b
for
 < T and b () = 0 for   T .
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instance, we have assumed that the decision maker forms expectations in a rational
way. In practice, this means that the decision maker should distinguish between
cases where more powerful interest groups do not provide information and cases
where less powerful interest groups do not provide information. Moreover, our neu-
trality result requires that the decision maker correctly assess the abilities of interest
groups to collect information. Finally, we have ignored the possibilities that interest
groups bribe decision makers and that decision makers may already have ideological
preferences over policies.
10 Appendix
As mentioned in Section 3, we assume i > 12 (h  l) to ensure that both parties
have an incentive to acquire information. If i  h l2 , then i = 1 and the decision
maker relies entirely on party i. To see this, suppose i  12 (h  l). Suppose that
if ma = , T = l. Then, party a chooses a so as to maximize,
a
1
2
(h+ l) + (1  a) l   1
2
a (a)
2
yielding
1
2
(h  l) = aa
Then, a = 1 for a  12 (h  l) :
10.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First we show T is decreasing in a and increasing in b: (8) solves for,
T =
8<:
1
b a

h (1  a )  l (1  b)  (h  l)
p
(1  a) (1  b)

if a 6= b
1
2
(h+ l) if a = b
9=;
(9)
This implies,
@T
@a
=
1
(b   a)2
p
(1  a) (1  b)
1  a| {z }
>0

a + b + 2
p
(1  a) (1  b)  2

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We need to show that a + b + 2
p
(1  a) (1  b)  2 < 0:
a + b + 2
p
(1  a) (1  b)  2 < 0
4 (a   1) (b   1) < (2  a   b)2
4 (a   1) (b   1)  (2  a   b)2 < 0
  (a   b)2 < 0
Therefore,
@(T )
@a
< 0. Symmetry implies,
@(T )
@b
> 0:
Next, we can show that a > b , T < 12 (l + h) :
=) : Assume a > b: Let T = 12 (l + h) + e, so e < 0 implies T < 12 (l + h) :
Substituting in (9) implies,
1
b   a

h (1  a)  l (1  b)  (h  l)
p
(1  a) (1  b)

=
l + h
2
+ e
1
a   b| {z }
>0
0@a + b + 2p(a   1) (b   1)  2| {z }
<0
1A = e
Thus, if a > b, then e < 0 which implies T < 12 (l + h).
(: Assume T < 1
2
(l + h). Then (9) reduces to,
1
b   a

h (1  a)  l (1  b)  (h  l)
p
(1  a) (1  b)

<
1
2
(l + h)
1
a   b
0@a + b + 2p(a   1) (b   1)  2| {z }
<0
1A < 0
Thus, we must have a > b.
Lastly, we can show that a < b , T < 12 (l + h) :
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(: Assume T < 1
2
(l + h). This implies a > b,
a   b > 0 
h  T 2
2a (h  l)  
 
T   l2
2b (h  l) > 0 
h  T 2
a
 
 
T   l2
b
> 0
b
 
h  T 2   a  T   l2 > 0
b

h 

l + h
2
+ e
2
  a

l + h
2
+ e

  l
2
> 0
b

h  l + 2e
2
2
  a

h  l + 2e
2
2
> 0
(b   a)

h  l + 2e
2
2
> 0
=) b > a
Substituting T = 1
2
(l + h) + e and assuming, without loss of generality, that
h =  l we obtain,
b

h 

l + h
2
+ e
2
  a

l + h
2
+ e

  l
2
> 0
b ( e)2   a (e)2 > 0
(b   a) (e)2 > 0
=) b > a
=) : Assume a < b. Similar to the last derivation, we obtain,
a   b =
 
h  T 2
2a (h  l)  
 
T   l2
2b (h  l)
=
1
2 (h  l)ab

b
 
h  T 2   a  T   l2
=
1
2 (h  l)ab (e)
2 (b   a) > 0
Thus, if a < b, then a > b, which implies T < 12 (l + h) :
17
10.2 Proof of Proposition 3
For simplicity, assume h =  l: This does not alter our results. If h =  l; then we
need to show E (x) = E () = h+l
2
= 0.
E (x) = abE ()| {z }
both nd info
+ a (1  b)
2664E  j > T | {z }
a reveals
+ T
T   l
h  l| {z }
a conceals
3775+ :::
+(1  a) b
2664E  j < T | {z }
b reveals
+ T
h  T
h  l| {z }
b conceals
3775+ (1  a) (1  b)T| {z }
neither nd info
= ab

h+ l
2

| {z }
=0
+ (a   ab)

T   l
h  l 
T +
h  T
h  l :
T + h
2

+ :::
+(1  a) (1  b)T + (b   ab)

T   l
h  l :
l + T
2
+
h  T
h  l 
T

= a
0BBBB@ T + 
T + h
2h
T +
h2    T 2
4h| {z }
=
(h T )2
4h
1CCCCA  b
0BBBB@T + h
2    T 2
4h
  h  
T
2h
T| {z }
=
(h+T )2
4h
1CCCCA
+T + ab
 
T   
T + h
2h
T   h
2    T 2
4h
+
h2    T 2
4h
  h  
T
2h
T
!
| {z }
=0
=
 
T
2
(a   b) + 2Th (2  a   b) + h2 (a   b)
4h
If h =  l, equation (7) reduces to,
 
T
2
(a   b) + 2Th (2  a   b) + h2 (a   b) = 0
Using this, we have E (x) = 0.
10.3 Proof Proposition 4
See main text.
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